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SIGNATURE AND ILLUSION: LESSONS FROM THE
BAROQUE FOR ‘TRUTH’ IN LAW, ARTS AND
HUMANITIES
Richard Mohr*
Abstract. Basic to contemporary problems in the disciplines of representation and interpretation is
a split between a naïve acceptance of bare facts, presumed to exist in their own ‘objective’ world of
objects, and the actions of subjects who interpret an intersubjective world. The solution is sought in
some ‘new’ epistemologies: Martín Alcoff, Grosz, Kristeva, Butler, as well as in Benjamin and
Gadamer, who look back to older ways of knowing. The methodology is an archaeology of these
ways of knowing, focussed on a crucial transition in the understanding of representation between
the renaissance and the baroque. It uses quintessential methods of the humanities: narrative,
keywords and critique. The narrative tracks two keywords of the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries, signature and illusion (inganno), through their uses in renaissance science and baroque arts
and philosophy. Following the enlightenment split between the understanding of the arts or
humanities and sciences, the keywords re-emerge in familiar contemporary legal forms: the signature
as an efficacious performative; illusion as ideology and repression. The truth in law, as in the arts
and humanities, is built up from interrogation of representations, prior understanding, and
comprehension of human motivation. For this it needs a hermeneutics based in tradition and
memory. Since representations and interpretations can be vehicles for rationalisation and repression,
there is also need for a critical hermeneutics, which may find truth in unexpected places, such as the
repressed memory uncovered in an old ritual or image.

1.0 INTRODUCTION
New interest in ‘the humanities’, particularly from scholars of law, has many manifestations and a
number of sources. It can be seen in initiatives such as two new journals on law and humanities
started in 2005 and 2007 in the USA and UK respectively, in the recent establishment of the
Australian Consortium of Humanities Research Centres (ACHRC), or in Martha Nussbaum’s
work on the importance of the humanities (which followed her work on ‘humanity’ and the law).1
Among the sources of this interest appear to be both push and pull factors.
*

1

Director, Social Research Policy & Planning, and Visiting Professorial Fellow in the Legal Intersections Research Centre,
Faculty of Law, University of Wollongong. rmohr@srpp.com.au. A version of this paper was given as the keynote address
to the International Conference on Arts, Ideas and the Baroque, at the 9th Montreal Baroque Festival, ‘Péchés capiteaux’.
24-25 June 2011. The author acknowledges the generous support and encouragement of Professor Desmond Manderson
and Dr Leigh Yetter, Institute for the Public Life of Arts and Ideas, McGill University, Montreal.
Nussbaum Martha C. Not for Profit: Why Democracy Needs the Humanities Princeton University Press Princeton 2010;
Nussbaum Martha C. Hiding from Humanity: Disgust, Shame and the Law Princeton University Press Princeton 2004
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On one hand, there is the threat posed by a certain neglect of knowledge and of disciplines
that do not feed directly in to ‘economic’ pursuits. The arts and humanities are ‘[s]een by policymakers as useless frills at a time when nations must cut away all useless things in order to stay
competitive in the global market’.2 It is a theme that has rapidly come to the fore in the UK with
the 2010 report of the Browne review to the Conservative government, which suggests an end to
subsidies for all courses except medicine, science, engineering and modern languages.3 Disciplines
that are not oriented to technology or the economy feel threatened and are drawing up the
wagons around a common area that is called, in an almost residual sense, ‘humanities’.
On the more positive side, there is a broadening of perspectives. After ‘law and society’,
‘law and literature’, critical legal studies and the rapid expansion in the late twentieth century of
cultural studies4, it has seemed increasingly artificial to put interdisciplinary studies of law and
legal phenomena into such silos. Interdisciplinarity and an impatience with artificial boundaries
are also characteristic of the broader humanities ‘movement’, exemplified in the interests and
discussions among members of the ACHRC. In legal studies and the humanities there is a sense
that the streams have converged and we can begin to discern the outlines of a fine river.
From this quick description of recent moves in law and the humanities, we can see both
exclusive and inclusive forces. Humanities is not science, not technology. It is a concern with a
wide range of pursuits including arts, history, culture, ideas and media. Moreover, it takes a
particular interest in the connections between those areas. In trying to define our areas of interest in
law and the humanities it is important to keep these common understandings in mind, while at
the same time seeking a better understanding of the foundations and strengths of the humanities,
particularly at their interface with legal phenomena.
Law and the humanities focus on human cultural products, including art and media as well
as texts such as legal, historical and literary documents. The need for interpretation is common to
all of these interests. In what follows I explore the nature of interpretation and its role in the
humanities and culture. My intention is to explore some common methodological foundations for
the humanities. This is an epistemological program, asking the question: how do we know?
Because it is not divorced from practice (whether scholarship or social, cultural or legal practice),
it also has an ontological dimension, which refers to the conditions of social life and practice:
how do we live (together)?
This article begins by identifying contemporary problems in the disciplines of
representation and interpretation. Basic to these is a split between a naïve acceptance of bare
facts, presumed to exist in their own ‘objective’ world of objects, and the actions of subjects who
2
3

4

As above (2010) at 2.
Shepherd Jessica. 2010. ‘Browne review: Universities warned to expect £4.2bn cuts’ The Guardian. 15 October 2010.
http://www.guardian.co.uk/education/2010/oct/15/browne-review-universities-cuts?INTCMP=ILCNETTXT3487
accessed 30 January 2012.
This ‘cultural turn’ has been echoed in a ‘spatial turn’ and a ‘pictorial turn’. The latter is of particular relevance to the
rediscovery of the baroque and the subject matter of this article. See for example Delaney David ‘Semantic Ecology and
Lexical Violence: Nature at the Limits of Law’ (2001) 5 2 Law Text Culture 77-112; Hess-Lüttuch Ernst W. B. ‘Spatial
Turn: On the Concept of Space in Cultural Geography and Literary Theory’ (2011) 9-10 Lexia 23-42 and, on the ‘pictorial
turn’, chapter 1, of that name, in Mitchell W J T Picture Theory. Essays on Verbal and Visual Representation University of
Chicago Press Chicago 1994

46

SIGNATURE AND ILLUSION: LESSONS FROM THE BAROQUE FOR `TRUTH' IN LAW, ARTS AND HUMANITIES

interpret an intersubjective world. The problem is illustrated by instances of deception in politics
and misconceptions of law. The solution is sought in some ‘new’ epistemologies, of recent
feminists as well as Walter Benjamin and Hans-Georg Gadamer, which look back to older ways
of knowing. To unearth the archaeology of these ways of knowing, I go back to a crucial
transition in the understanding of representation between the renaissance and the baroque.
My methodological process is an exercise in showing by doing. In seeking to elucidate the
foundations of the humanities, I plan to use quintessential methods of the humanities: narrative,
keywords and critique. My narrative is based on the historical trajectory of two keywords of the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries: signatura and inganno; signature and delusion.5 At the first
appearance of these keywords, their original meanings and uses are explained. The narrative
resumes to trace their fortunes, through the changing understanding of the uses of
representation, and the divergent epistemological foundations of the sciences and the arts.
Between the shores of object and subject, sundered by the enlightenment, the humanities were
left isolated in the torrent. In conclusion the keywords re-emerge in familiar contemporary legal
forms: the signature as an efficacious performative; delusion as ideology and repression. In these
guises they have offered new direction for research in law and the humanities, in exploring the
interactions between subjects and objects, people and things, power and pictures.
Seeing these key concepts through the fresh eyes of the baroque opens new possibilities
for understanding and critique. The signature, as a legal performative, really does change the civil
world. Games of illusion once again reveal truths in art and the power of dreams. The baroque
discovered not only that appearances may deceive, but that they may be used to deceive.
Representations, as ‘entities that don’t sleep’, are the stuff of social power. Without them our
social interactions would be ephemeral, a social order rebuilt every morning, as in Serres’s
‘unstable band of baboons [where] social changes are flaring up every minute’.6 We rely on
concrete representations, embodied in objects, in law and all other practices of the social order.
We also need an informed scepticism, a ‘hermeneutics of suspicion’, that allows us to decode the
repressive languages of power and to distinguish the truth, in art, law or politics, from the
deception.

2.0 PRACTICAL PROBLEMS—EPISTEMOLOGICAL SOLUTIONS?
Law and the humanities are both based on representation and interpretation. They conjure
images, combine words and inquire into the meanings and uses of those constellations. These
activities are neglected in many areas of scholarship and public life, replaced by a naïve
5

6

In what follows I will generally prefer the Italian word inganno or the Spanish equivalent engaño, since they carry a deeper
meaning than ‘delusion’ or ‘illusion’ and imply trickery, as does the French trompe. I hope their meaning will be explicated
by reference to primary sources in Italian and in Spanish.
Serres Michel Genesis University of Michigan Press Ann Arbor 1995 at 87. The example has been elaborated by Latour and
Strum: see Latour Bruno Reassembling the Social: An introduction to Actor-Network-Theory Oxford University Press Oxford
2005 at 69-70.
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empiricism: ‘WYSIWYG’—‘what you see is what you get’—in the jargon of the dotcom decade;
‘facts’ (‘not assertions’), to quote Colin Powell’s description of the grainy images he showed the
United Nations on 3rd February 2003 to justify the invasion of Iraq.7
Powell’s performance at the United Nations highlights one of the key reasons we need to
rediscover methods appropriate to the arts and humanities. He expressly denied the need to
interpret his pictures or audio grabs of intercepted phone calls. Instead he claimed they allowed
unmediated access to ‘facts’. While Powell was staking a claim to unmediated factual knowledge,
one of the greatest anti-war artworks of the twentieth century, a version of Picasso’s Guernica in
the foyer of the UN building, had been shrouded over. The reason given by the UN authorities
was that a plain surface was more suitable for press conferences. A member of the Australian
Parliament, Laurie Brereton, considered it more plausible that it was to avoid embarrassment to
the United States, in having its Ambassador or Secretary of State being seen to promote war with
Iraq ‘against a backdrop depicting images of women and children and animals crying with horror
and showing the suffering of war’.8
Denying the need to interpret sense data–grainy images or scratchy recordings–Powell
advocated the simple perception of ‘facts’. What we see is the truth, and it comes to us preinterpreted. We have direct access to facts. The shrouding of Guernica illustrated the subversive
threat of art, of images. Guernica ‘depicts’ war in a very different way than Powell’s slide show. It
must be interpreted, and knowing the story behind it helps. Guernica communicates in a more
honest, and perhaps more powerful way than Colin Powell did. Conflicts like this, between
immediate access to ‘facts’ and the ethical interpretation of art or texts, are often seen to
represent a distinction between the sciences and the humanities. Yet interpretation underlies any
approach to knowledge.
Law, more than any other discipline, is based on interpretation. Hermeneutics is at its
heart. Yet even law has succumbed to a sort of cultural cringe before the natural sciences,
apologising for its arguments and recoiling from its representations.9 Despite the important
contributions law made to western epistemology in renaissance times, there are now few scholars
who recognise the value and broader relevance of forensic inquiry and legal interpretation and
decision making.10 The fact-value distinction had its roots in the subtleties of jurisprudence, and
yet is turned against the law in accusations that it is a ‘fraud … that obscures the truth’.11 Is there
a form of truth appropriate to law?
To compare the truth or honesty of a work of art, literature or law with that of ‘facts’ or
documentary images is to inquire into the processes of representation and interpretation that go
7
8
9
10

11

As above Latour at 18.
Brereton Laurie 2003. ‘Shroud over Guernica’ Sydney Morning Herald 5 February 2003. http://www.smh.com.au/articles/
2003/02/05/1044318661158.html accessed 11 January 2011.
Sherwin Richard K. ‘Law, Metaphysics and the New Iconoclasm’ (2007) 11 Law Text Culture 70 –105.
Hampshire Stuart Innocence and Experience Harvard University Press Cambridge MA 1989 at 54; Shapiro Barbara J A Culture
of Fact: England 1550 –1720 Cornell University Press Ithaca 2000 at 10-11; Toulmin Stephen The Uses of Argument
Cambridge University Press Cambridge, UK 1964 at 7.
Evan Whitton ‘The Law Report’ ABC Radio National 15 July 1997. The Chief Justice at the time accepted that law’s role
was ‘not to pursue the truth’. Mason Sir Anthony The Future of Adversarial Justice, paper presented at the 17th AIJA Annual
Conference, Adelaide, 7 August 1999.
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into each. Gadamer reaches back across the enlightenment to rediscover a humanism which he
traces from late Roman law to Vico, in the late baroque. It is characterised by an approach to the
‘art and practice of law that is closer to the practical ideal of phronesis than the theoretical ideal
of sophia’.12 It requires common sense, taste and judgment. Since the rupture of the methods of
the human sciences and the arts from the natural sciences, under Kant’s influence, it is necessary
to rediscover the common ground of hermeneutics, so that all our faculties13 can be brought to
the task of interpretation, to discover the truth that is appropriate to the arts, humanities and law.
Benjamin’s contribution to ways of knowing deriving from the baroque involves a new
appreciation of the role of the object, the body part and the corpse.14 Benjamin’s is still an
approach to epistemology–the ‘Epistemo-Critical Prologue’ to his book on baroque Trauerspiel
(German tragic drama) is his most sophisticated methodological statement–but in its approach to
redeeming the objects, to recombining things, and deciphering allegories it encompasses ontology
as well. To truly know something we must resonate with it, and so breach that Cartesian and
Kantian firewall between subject and object, the knower and the known.15 Our world is
populated by objects as much as by people and, like the baroque stage littered with corpses and
rapiers, or the Vanitas painting with its skull and books, it must be interpreted with a full
appreciation of the power of objects, emblems and allegory.
These twentieth century rediscoveries of some older ways of knowing have reverberated
also in feminist epistemology since the 1980s. The Cartesian subject-object distinction was
interrupted by Kristeva’s notion of the abject, whose only point in common with the object is its
opposition to the ‘I’, a subject.16 Yet it poses a fundamental threat to the self in its uncanny
resemblance. If the corpse on the baroque stage, like the flat-lining encephalogram of Kristeva’s
example, signifies death, the real, putrefying corpse indicates death, it points to it.17 This horror
between subject and object, between self and its negation, calls forth the original repression of the
abject, played out in religious, moral and legal codes.18 The religious crises of the baroque era
witnessed a renegotiation of the abject, without ever resolving our ‘most intimate and serious
apocalypses’.19 That would require the completion (‘achèvement’) of religion through a
‘demystification of Power’ in all its social aspects: ‘religious, moral, political and verbal’.20 I will
return, in the conclusion, to questions of demystification, critique of ideology and the overcoming
of repression.
12
13

14
15
16
17
18
19
20

Gadamer Hans-Georg Truth and Method Continuum New York 1989 at 20.
I intend ‘faculties’ in the sense that Chaïm Perelman uses it here: ‘People who argue do not address what we call ‘faculties’,
such as intellect, emotion, or will; they address the whole person, but, depending on the circumstances, their arguments
will seek different results and will use methods appropriate to the purpose of the discourse as well as to the audience to be
influenced.’ Quoted Tindale Christopher W Acts of Arguing: A Rhetorical Model of Argument State University of New York
Press Albany 1999 at 4. It is an ironic and happy coincidence that in the present context it could also refer to the academic
disciplinary boundaries.
Benjamin Walter The Origin of German Tragic Drama NLB London 1977 (1928) at 132-9, 218.
As above at 33-4.
Kristeva Julia Pouvoirs de l’horreur: Essai sur l’abjection Éditions du Seuil Paris 1980 at 9.
As above at 11.
As above at 23, 247.
As above at 246.
As above at 247.
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In other advances in feminist epistemology, Christine Buci-Glucksmann’s Baroque Reason
highlights the baroque tropes that were central to Benjamin’s methods, ‘the Reason of the
Other’.21 Linda Martín Alcoff bases her feminist and social epistemology on a reading of
Gadamer’s hermeneutics through the lens of the coherence theory of knowing.22 The common
project here is the location of knowledge and the knower in a social space. Knowledge results
from social activity, not passive reception. In common with Foucault, Martín Alcoff identifies
knowledge with power, and champions ‘subjugated knowledges’: truth is ‘a strategic intervention
into current discursive power relations’.23 Underlying each of these readings is a rejection of the
Cartesian ‘dichotomy of knowing subject and known object’, which Grosz sees at the root of our
recent ‘crisis of reason’ which privileges ‘the purely conceptual or mental over the corporeal’.24

3.0 KEYWORD: SIGNATURE (NATURE AND SCIENCE)
The new sciences of the renaissance paid particular attention to the evidence available in the
natural world. Ficino held that earthly things are able ‘to channel (condurre) divine power to the
human realm, drawing them together by means of their similitude’, their resemblance to
significant celestial bodies.25 Paracelsus compiled a Compendium (op. post. 1567) of plants and their
connections with parts of the body and their afflictions. In his Signatura Rerum, the ‘signature of
the thing’, Paracelsus elaborated the idea that the appearance of a thing was a marker for its
power or efficacy: plants have a direct link to the body parts they cure. Many of these visual
associations can be found in the plants’ botanical names: pulmonaria works on the lungs, uvularia
on the throat, and palma christi on the hands. For Paracelsus this was an unmediated power,
exercised directly by the thing and indicated through its appearance. The signatura is the link
between the outer and visible aspect of the thing, such as a plant, and its inner, invisible nature.26
In the renaissance keyword of ‘signature’, the manifestation of a thing is the guarantee of its
efficacy.
Astrology studied the heavens and, working from the appearances of the constellations and
the ancient personifications of the planets, sought links with human affairs. The stars and planets,
like Paracelsus’ plants, exercised a certain unmediated power on Earth. The frescos from the early
renaissance Palazzo Schifanoia in Ferrara illustrate the point. In twelve sets of three panels the
top panel represents the dominant planet in the month depicted, while the bottom panel shows
the main agricultural activities in that season, as well as other human activities under the influence
of the heavens. There are twelve such sets of panels. The middle panels remained mysterious for
centuries until, just one hundred years ago, Aby Warburg’s research into Arabic sources of
21
22
23
24
25
26

Buci-Glucksmann Christine Baroque Reason: The Aesthetics of Modernity Sage London 1994 at 39.
Martín Alcoff Linda Real Knowing: New Versions of the Coherence Theory Cornell University Press Ithaca 1996 at 46-7.
As above at 148-9.
Grosz Elizabeth ‘Bodies and Knowledges: Feminism and the Crisis of Reason’ in Alcoff Linda and Potter Elizabeth (eds)
Feminist Epistemologies Routledge New York & London 1993 p 187 at 187-89.
Bianchi Massimo Luigi Signatura rerum: Segni, magia e conoscenza da Paracelso a Leibniz Edizioni dell’Ateneo Roma 1987 at 26.
As above at 28 and see plates 2-3, where Fabricius illustrates the resemblance between the plant and the body part it cures.
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renaissance astrology revealed them as ‘decani’, particular images of celestial bodies that played a
part in human affairs. Warburg’s careful decoding of renaissance art and allegory became a model
for twentieth century art scholarship, influencing the German tradition of both Benjamin and
Gadamer. He concluded that astrological power in the renaissance was ‘a fetishism of names
projected into the future’, so that, for example, one born under the sign of Venus would have
qualities corresponding to those of the mythological Venus: love and the simple pleasures of
life.27
One small detail of the panels depicting March illustrates my theme of representation and
the senses. Sense data—such as the appearance of a thing—was seen as a guarantee of the thing
itself, of a fact. In the bottom panel depicting human activities, under a doorway labelled ‘Justice’,
we see four of the five senses represented: by the eyes, an ear framed between two heads, a nose
silhouetted against the doorway, and, below that, a hand. In this renaissance economy of
representation, justice is dignified and guaranteed by association with such reliable and direct
sensory testing of the real world. So in the fifteenth century there was seen to be a direct and
reliable link between representation and reality. The discovery of perspective lent a guarantee of
geometrical certainty to our representations of the world. This new science of perspective
guaranteed the reliability of representation in paintings of landscapes and buildings, while the
then respectable sciences of astrology and Paracelsian medicine confirmed these links. Law, as
depicted in the Palazzo Schifanoia, required a true perception of the ‘facts’, relying on the senses.

4.0 KEYWORD: INGANNO (THE BAROQUE)
Foucault has termed the renaissance ‘the age of resemblance’, in reference to this innocent
acceptance of the correspondence between the thing, its nature and our perceptions of it. By the
seventeenth century this was overturned by the ‘games’ of the baroque era, ‘whose powers of
enchantment grow out of the new kinship between resemblance and illusion’.28 Baroque art and
architecture abound in trompe l’œil and virtuoso displays of illusion. Games of perspective give the
illusion of depth, flat ceilings appear to rise up to the heavens, marble is carved into voluptuous
folds of fabric.29 Galluzzi has contrasted the ‘scientific’ painting of the renaissance, with its
fascination with perspective, to the ‘literary and rhetorical’ painting of the baroque, with its
memento mori and allegorical depictions of Vanitas.30 Foucault draws attention to the baroque’s
theatrical comic illusions and plays-within-a-play.31 Artworks ranging from the sculptures of
27

28
29

30
31

Warburg Aby Arte Italiana e astrologia internazionale nel Palazzo Schifanoja di Ferrara Abscondita Milano 2006 (1912) at 17. See
also Agamben’s attribution to Warburg of the discovery of the signature, as ‘neither sign nor symbol’. Agamben Giorgio
Signatura rerum: sul metodo Bollati Boringhieri Torino 2008 at 59.
Foucault Michel The Order of Things Random House New York 1994 at 51.
Examples can be found, respectively, in a chapel of Santa Cecilia in Trastevere where a marble bas relief no more than a
couple of centimetres deep appears to recede into the distance, in the ceiling of Sant’Ignazio in Rome, and in numerous
sculptures by Michelangelo as well as dozens of lesser known artists.
Galluzzi Francesco Il Barocco Newton & Compton Roma 2005 at 37.
Above note 28 at 51.
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fantastical creatures in the ‘park of monsters’ at Bomarzo in northern Lazio, to the castrati’s arias
in Vivaldi’s operas seek to inspire a sense of ‘meraviglia’, wonderment at the evocation of the
impossible.
The central keyword of the Italian baroque was inganno (Spanish engaño, French trompe): a
trick, a sharp practice, an illusion, yes, but with a certain malicious intent, a delusion. It was born
of the distrust and suspicion of the senses that arose at the beginning of the seventeenth century
when, as Foucault points out:
thought ceases to move in the element of resemblance. Similitude is no longer the form of
knowledge but rather the occasion of error, the danger to which one exposes oneself when
one does not examine the obscure region of confusions.32

Among the three possible sources of the word ‘barocco’, in addition to the conventionally
accepted ‘misshapen pearl’, is a medieval term for a sharp commercial practice, an ‘inganno
economico e commerciale’ that came to refer to the devious tricks of card sharps.33
Inganno is clearly untrustworthy and misleading; it can ensnare us in its net, by which it is
identified in Ripa’s book of iconology.34 Yet the artists and architects of the baroque loved to play
with illusion. This was intended to go beyond the moral homily, that motivated the Vanitas
paintings for example, to say something about representation as such. In addition to commenting
on the unreliability of the senses, it is also a means of demonstrating human intervention and
creativity in representation. Humanity can meddle with the presentation of sensory experience to
make something appear in a totally new way. The words of a Vivaldi aria invoke storms at sea as a
means of inducing powerful and turbulent emotions in the audience. The staging and the
architecture of the baroque were constantly experimenting with these illusions and trompe l’œil.
They called attention to the inganno, or trompe, at the same time using it to emphasise that the
world is open to interpretation and that these representations could be effective as a source of
meraviglia, knowledge and even power. Powerful images are no longer just those presented by
nature, but they include human artefacts. The baroque has cast doubt on the unmediated efficacy
of natural objects, driven by their appearance, and has started to explore the tricks and games by
which we are deluded. This brings our own, human-produced images into the frame. And now
we enter a new phase of the games of representation: how society, law and the powerful
themselves intervene in the civil world through images and delusions.

32
33
34

As above at 51.
Above note 30 at 20.
Leone Massimo ‘Rete: la metafora e lo strumento. La democrazia e i suoi attori, il controllo e le libertà ‘ (2002) Golem
l’indispensabile; Ripa Cesare Iconologia Neri Pozza Vicenza 2000 (1618).
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5.0 REPRESENTATION AND EFFICACY IN HUMAN AFFAIRS
Following the Council of Trent in the mid to late sixteenth century, art and other forms of
propaganda were enlisted in the battle against the Protestant reformation. The new approaches to
representation and practices of political theology and Tridentine propaganda went hand in hand
with a raised awareness of the socio-political power of art and of objects. The seventeenth
century witnessed high levels of games and of serious social contests carried out at the level of
representation. The arts and literature of the time explored both the theory and practice of
representation and interpretation, amounting to ‘a convergence of political and philosophical
experiments with visual and artistic ones’. 35
The very concept of representation itself underwent important developments in this
period.36 Hobbes’ Leviathan was an important argument for the sovereign as representative of the
people, which was powerfully reinforced by the image on the frontispiece (1651), where the huge
sovereign coming over the hill is made up of hundreds of tiny people. The sovereign ‘stands for’
the people in a symbolic sense which is reproduced descriptively in the engraving. The image has its
own power.
One of the key works of baroque drama is the Spanish play La Vida es Sueño (Life is a
Dream, 1673) by Calderón de la Barca. The theme of the play is summed up in the often quoted
last two lines of the hero Segismundo’s soliloquy, which give the play its title:
… toda la vida es sueño,
y los sueños, sueños son.

Of greater interest, however, are three lines at the beginning of that soliloquy:
Sueña el rey que es rey, y vive
con este engaño mandando,
disponiendo y gobernando
The king dreams he is king, and lives
with this delusion ordering,
decreeing and governing …37

All human relations, and the human condition itself, are no more than a dream. The king only
dreams his sovereignty, just as the poor man dreams his misery. Yet this passage draws attention
35

36
37
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to the social power of these dreams: dream as it may be, the king governs with this engaño. This
‘with’ may be seen as something the king just has to live with, like someone ‘living with AIDS’,
but it should also be seen in an instrumental sense: the king orders, decrees and governs ‘con este
engaño’: by means of this delusion.
Not only images but also other objects took on immense social and political power, seen
both in arts and in the civic affairs of religion and politics. This was expressed in baroque theatre,
where, as Benjamin points out, stage props became players in the action, often as the instruments
of fate: he gives the example of the rapier in Hamlet. 38 Corpses and body parts, too, could play
effective roles, in some ways more effective than live humans, who tended more to be buffeted
by fate than to be masters of it. Benjamin quotes a late seventeenth century source: ‘The whole
human body cannot enter a symbolical icon, but it is not inappropriate for part of the body to
constitute it’.39 We may think here of the medieval and continuing Catholic cult of the relics of
saints, which is also reflected in the Trauerspiel studied by Benjamin: ‘martyrdom prepares the
body of the living person for emblematic purposes’.40
As the body part represents and instantiates the power of the saint, metonymy became part
of the new baroque political theology: the crown makes (or is) the king.41 Buci-Glucksmann
describes the severed head as ‘a kind of figuration of desire, a trope in the precise sense’ of
designating something that has no name.42 Objects and symbols had, since at least medieval
times, been understood to invoke power. Before the baroque this had been a divine power, or the
power of nature: the relic, crown, sceptre, constellation or medicinal plant. The baroque now
understood this power as something that was effective for political purposes, and could be
studied, invoked, ridiculed and manipulated for those purposes, at once deceptive and effective.
Recognising the power of representation as a human artefact, and not simply a reflection of
nature, opens the way to its conscious political use. Tropes and emblems are instances of this new
economy of representation, self conscious and critical. These images and artifacts are recognised
as human products yet are still capable of calling forth mysterious powers.

6.0 A NEW SCIENCE
We find another allegorical emblem towards the end of the baroque period, in 1730, in the
frontispiece to Giambattista Vico’s New Science, which begins with a lengthy ‘explanation’ of the
picture. A woman with winged temples is ‘metaphysic’, or the new science itself. The jewel on her
breast is illuminated by God through his providence. She contemplates God ‘in an attitude of
ecstasy’ at a higher level than the world of nature, which had been the concern of the
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philosophers up to that time. Vico’s science ‘contemplates in God the world of human minds …
to show His providence in … the civil world or world of nations’. 43 The human institutions of
writing, cultivation, navigation, music, commerce, law and government are represented by various
objects or ‘hieroglyphs’ on the ground: the scales of justice, a rudder, text. The imbalance of the
philosophers’ hitherto focus on the natural world, to the exclusion of the world of human
institutions and culture, is signified by the globe of the natural world being only half supported by
the altar. Later in the book, Vico writes of ‘the never failing light of a truth beyond all question’:
[T]he world of civil society has certainly been made by men so that its principles can and
must be discovered within the modifications of our own human mind. Whoever reflects on
this cannot but marvel that the philosophers should have bent all their energies to the study
of the world of nature, which, since God made it, He alone knows; and that they should
have neglected the study of the world of nations, or civil world, which since men have made
it, men could come to know.44

This is not a detached study that absorbs all knowledge into itself: the jewel on the woman’s
breast refracts the light outwards again, to illuminate ‘public moral institutions’. Again Vico draws
the contrast with prior philosophy, in a passage redolent of Marx’s, that the philosophers have
missed the point, which is to ‘change’ or act in the world. Vico’s new science, then, is a study of
culture, law and human institutions that analyses myth, history and philology in order to seek an
empathetic understanding of and through other human minds. It is a public and moral science, a
‘philosophy of authority’ that seeks to act back into the social and political world.45
Let’s take stock, now, of this overview of the baroque’s new approach to knowledge and
representation, before moving on to see how it was submerged in the enlightenment before being
rediscovered in the twentieth century. The renaissance had taken very seriously the appearances
or manifestations of the natural world, whether of plants or planets. It studied such objects to
gain insight into their efficacy, their force in the world. The baroque questioned such literal
acceptance of the evidence of our senses: not only might sense perception be unreliable, it may
also offer a means by which we are tricked or deceived. The political theology of representation
was present everywhere, from the cities to the theatres, the churches to the courts. In each of
these stage-like settings (mise-en-scène, palcosceni) the power of objects became their social
power. The analysis of appearances could shift from the natural world to the social, to
comprehend culture and its political ramifications. The edge was blurred between knowing and
doing, between epistemology and ontology. We could now interpret the social world as our own
products, in linguistic and visual terms.
These were the lessons of the baroque that had been the subject of plays, paintings and
emblems, and that were distilled into a ‘study method’ by Vico.46 And yet these lessons were
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submerged by other approaches to knowledge and the sciences that led to the contemporary
malaise that I described at the beginning of this article. They are the lessons that we need to relearn from the baroque. Before describing how they were rediscovered in the twentieth century, it
is important to understand what went wrong. What interrupted our self awareness of the arts and
civic institutions? To ask such a question is to go to the heart of law and the humanities, studies
based squarely in that self awareness.
The period between the baroque and the twentieth century was dominated by a
‘metaphysic’ or science very different to Vico’s. Bacon and Descartes stand at the beginning of
this new history of science. Both were baroque figures in their own ways, yet they led science into
new directions. Bacon shared the baroque suspicion of the senses: his famous doctrine of the
idols that beset thought included one reminiscent of the inganno that ensnares us. The error of
believing that things were connected by their resemblances was the ‘idol of the tribe’.47 Descartes’
mind-body dualism was typical of the baroque,48 as was his mistrust of the spontaneous evidence
of the senses. To overcome the latter he proposed measurement and order, to calibrate difference
and identity.49
This gap between the conceptions of our mind and the natural world had to be overcome
in order to establish a reliable empirical science, a science of the ‘outside’ world. Kant provided
the solution. Science can develop adequate conceptions of things, to which the phenomena
conform.50 Representations no longer attempt a resemblance of the physical world, which can be
so deceptive, as baroque art had demonstrated. Instead, the phenomena conform to our a priori
representations, so the thought precedes the phenomenon. This is a Vichian effort: what we
know is a product of our own mind. But unlike Vico, who confined his study to the social world,
already a creature of the human mind, Kant declared a reliable link to the empirical, ‘outside’
world. All our measuring devices are directed towards testing the reliability of the connection
between our conceptions or representations and the observed phenomena. Physics became the
‘queen of the sciences’ and scientific laws of observable nature became the dominant way of
knowing. Facts were immediately apparent to the mind and had to correspond with the
phenomena.

7.0 DIVERGENCE OF THE ARTS: SYMBOL AND ALLEGORY
But if our conceptions are all objectively reliable and verifiable representations of an outside
world, where does that leave art and the humanities? Having done such a good job, in the
baroque, of discrediting sense experience, art was now to pay the price. Kant took on that
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challenge as well, and relegated the aesthetic to the realm of the subjective, as Gadamer has
explained:
The radical subjectivization involved in Kant’s new way of grounding aesthetics was truly
epoch-making. In discrediting any kind of theoretical knowledge except that of natural
science, it compelled the human sciences to rely on the methodology of the natural sciences
in conceptualizing themselves. But it made this reliance easier by offering the "artistic
element", "feeling", and "empathy" as subsidiary elements.51

If science was now about the objective apprehension of phenomena that guaranteed the
‘facts’, art took the opposite direction. Taste became subjective, and the romantic conception of
inexplicable genius could develop. Art was to be understood as raw experience (Erlebniskunst),
and not a foundation for analysis, critique and interpretation. The romantic appreciation of art is
all in our feelings: if our objective conceptions can lead to natural science through reliable
correspondence to reality, our subjective tastes lead us to swoon before beauty. Whether we are
confronting natural or artistic beauty, the response was to be subjective, unshared, overwhelming
experience.
Gadamer and Benjamin led the twentieth century’s efforts to rethink this obscurantist
dilemma (both in the arts and the human sciences) by going back to the baroque allegory. They
rethought the economy of representation by reclaiming the allegory as a way of knowing. In the
post-Kantian romantic era, the symbol became the dominant form of representation. The symbol’s
meaning is immediately apparent: it inheres in the form. Exhibiting a badge of identity–a
templar’s cross, a national flag or a corporate logo–forms an instant association with the group to
which we belong.52 Benjamin referred to this as the ‘paradox of the theological symbol’: the
material symbol and the abstraction for which it stands are collapsed into a single unity of
appearance and essence.53 The symbol is taken in at a glance: we either get it or we don’t.
Expressed in symbolist art that flourished in the late nineteenth century, the image releases a
charge of emotions which are presumed to reverberate instantly in the viewer.54
The allegory, on the other hand, must be read. It presumes a lexicon of meanings that are
based in tradition, in a long-running social context. Its interpretation is not subjective, depending
on the artist or the viewer to bring their own genius to it. An interpretation can be more or less
accurate, better connected to the tradition from which it springs, more or less rich in
understanding. This is what Gadamer means by ‘truth in art’. Through it we can overcome the
fragmented subjectivism of individual takes on a single work so that art may fulfill its role in ‘the
task of preserving the hermeneutic continuity which constitutes our being’.55
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The groundwork for this new appreciation of meaning and interpretation had been laid by
an important group of German art historians inspired particularly by Aby Warburg, mentioned
earlier, in the context of deciphering the meanings of the frescos in the Palazzo Schifanoia by
tracing the influence of Arabic astrological writings on the artists and their circle. Both Benjamin
and Gadamer looked back to the baroque as an age of allegory. Benjamin found in it a flourishing
of meanings and their opposites that guided his esoteric explorations. For Gadamer, it was the
last age in which the shared dogma of Europe was able to guide interpretation.
These divergent interests led to different issues for our own studies in law and the
humanities. Gadamer sees allegory as a means of knowing, of finding truth. His intention is
epistemological, an exercise in understanding, thinking and knowing (which, as Foucault notes, ‘is
always allegorical’).56 But if it is no longer guided by a shared dogma, how are we to save
hermeneutics from a hopeless partisanship in the contests of ideas? The critical edge of
hermeneutics comes into play in this new era when, in Kristeva’s terms, the old codes of religion
and ideology no longer suffice to purify and repress the threatening abject. The allegorical
memento mori or Vanitas painting signifies death in a stylised manner, as food for thought. The
symbolist painting comes to the fore in an era when religious feeling is reduced to psychology and
emotion, ‘shivers and goosebumps’ in Agamben’s terms.57 The repressed returns with the
twentieth century’s ‘great demystification of power’.58 Freud’s critique of repression, or Marx’s
critique of ideology, give rise to an alternative hermeneutics of suspicion, more critical than
Gadamer’s ‘hermeneutics of tradition’ and its close reading of the dogmas and meanings in which
a text or image is rooted. I return in section 9.0 of this article to this distinction and the ways it,
too, draws on the baroque. First, I will address some key questions opened up by Benjamin’s
interest in the power of things and in their links to ideas. In each of these concluding sections we
may see different areas of relevance to contemporary problems, which are both methodological
and practical: they concern the ‘study methods of our time’, as Vico put it, and they also
illuminate the contradictions that were performed at the United Nations on February 5th 2003.
These conclusions are organised into sections that revisit the two keywords with which I began:
signatura and inganno.

8.0 SIGNATURE 2 (THE PERFORMATIVE)
The power of things has been rediscovered anew since Benjamin’s work on the baroque. From
Austin’s performative to Latour’s actor network theory, the past half century has seen wellknown explorations of the role played by objects and signs in the social world.59 Of particular
importance to law have been the explorations of the signature, as a reiterated performative
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gesture, by Derrida and Butler.60 Before further consideration of that work, I would like to
explore, though Benjamin, the links and differences between the renaissance notion of the
signature and the phenomenon so central to current studies of law. Benjamin’s interest in the
power of things links the ontological and the epistemological. Benjamin sought not to match
phenomena to existing mental concepts but to redeem them, so that they could ‘participate in the
existence of ideas’, by representing them.61 This is by no means Kant’s one-to-one fit between the
concept and the phenomenon, but a dialectical process. In the manner of allegories, ideas are
built up, put into practice, and recalled by their associations with things. That leads us to question
how it is that objects and representations can enter into civic life and can change the social world.
Law is one of the formal, recognised ways in which the social world–or the civic order–is
definitively changed. Yet the means by which this could be done have been increasingly
challenged by sceptical views of law. The force of law moves from being an article of faith to an
intellectual problem: one solution involves the power of objects. Law relies on material
manifestations for its records and proofs. Files, evidence, documents and signatures are the
repository of law’s memory. Benjamin indicated the persistence of objects as the guarantee of
loyalty: ‘every loyal vow or memory surrounds itself with the fragments of the world of things as
its very own, not-too-demanding objects.’62
In changing the social world, the performative act of making a vow or taking an oath
requires a permanent trace. Unlike other speech acts that just describe the world, the
performative utterance brings something into existence. If renaissance science was wrong to see
the power or efficacy of natural objects in the pure manifestation of their appearance, we might
still redeem this insight for the human sciences. The study of the performative leads us to see that
in the English word itself, a ‘signature’ is something that has efficacy through its appearance. If I
sign a document such as a contract or a cheque, I have created a binding relationship that affects
me and others. This new relationship brings something into being in the social matrix that did not
exist before.
Derrida contributed the insight that the performative act, including the signature, must be
a repetitive ritual; that it partakes of a system of social power, which can even be subverted.63
Butler further developed the notion that the very power inherent in the repeated citation of a
performative formula can also be turned back on, or more subtlely remake the political or legal
order.
Thus, performativity has its own social temporality in which it remains enabled precisely by
the contexts from which it breaks. This ambivalent structure at the heart of performativity
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implies that, within political discourse, the very terms of resistance and insurgency are
spawned in part by the powers they oppose….64

The insight that a sign or a mark can be effective by being revealed may have led to a dead
end in the natural sciences. God did not, after all, sign His works so they might guide us.
However, when this idea is refracted into the social sciences, using the principles discovered by
Vico, it leads to important insights. While scientists looking for manifest signs in the natural
world lacked a viable research program, the examination of Vico’s ‘world of civil society’, that we
ourselves have made, reveals that we can understand our own actions and their effects in that
world. The study of the marks made by people, whether these be signatures or works of art, is
open to interpretations through various means: semiotics, discourse analysis, hermeneutics or
iconology. That these marks and objects do not only describe the world, but also make and
remake it, is a characteristic insight of the baroque which was rediscovered in the twentieth
century.65 Subsequent work revealed that these mechanisms of political power can themselves be
an instrument of social change or subversion. These developments bring to the practices of the
arts and law the scholarship they deserve.

9.0 INGANNO 2 (HERMENEUTICS )
That these signs may sometimes deceive us is another powerful insight of the baroque. If signs
and communications are used for social regulation, then it is important to have means for
evaluating and criticising those constraints. The baroque games of inganno and trompe l’œil
rehearsed in art the lessons that were explored by scholars and critics of law and civil society,
from Calderón to Vico.
Iconoclasm–suspicion of idols and fetishes–has a long history in the Abrahamic religions.
Iconoclasm has a history at least as old as idolatry. … Indeed, one might argue that
iconoclasm is simply the obverse of idolatry, that it is nothing more than idolatry turned
outward toward the image of a rival, threatening tribe.66

What was novel in the baroque was the playful exploration of appearance and illusion, and the
political and philosophical critique of the relationship between the two. Gadamer revives an
interest in games as a methodology: in this he follows Huizinga and was followed by Derrida.67
They open up a world of possibilities, remove a fourth wall, so that play comes into focus as both
64
65
66
67

Butler Judith Excitable Speech: A Politics of the Performative Routledge New York 1997 at 40.
Austin above note 59; Benveniste Emile Problèmes de linguistique générale Gallimard Paris 1966 at 265; Foucault above note
56 at 119-21.
Mitchell W. J. T. Iconology: Image, Text, Ideology University of Chicago Press Chicago 1986 at 198.
Above note 12 at 103-09; Huizinga Johan Homo Ludens. A Study of the Play Element in Culture Beacon Press Boston 1952;
Derrida above note 60 at 18; Derrida Jacques Writing and Difference University of Chicago Press Chicago 1978 at 292. These
authors use ‘play’ in all its senses: the play in a loose rope, child’s play, and a dramatic work. Their work illustrates the
connections between those senses.

60

SIGNATURE AND ILLUSION: LESSONS FROM THE BAROQUE FOR `TRUTH' IN LAW, ARTS AND HUMANITIES

an aspect of interpretation and a component of social and legal communication. Gadamer
distinguishes the ‘abundance of viewpoints’ this affords from the serious critique of ideology
(another manifestation of iconoclasm). He finds it ‘frighteningly unreal when people like
Habermas ascribe to rhetoric a compulsory quality that one must reject in favor of unconstrained,
rational dialogue’.68 Ricœur has characterised this dispute between Gadamer and Habermas as the
contest between a ‘hermeneutics of tradition’, based on ‘reminiscence’ and one based on
‘suspicion’.69 While defending Gadamer’s appeals to tradition, Ricœur proposes, in juxtaposition,
a critical hermeneutics, that sees the role of power relations in distortion and delusion. The
negation of recognition (connaissance) of the other, of communication, is misrecognition
(méconnaissance),70 which is ‘ peculiar to the problem of ideology.’
It can be analysed phenomenologically only by appealing to concepts of a psychoanalytic
type: to illusion as distinct from error, to projection as constitution of a false transcendence, to
rationalisation as the subsequent rearrangement of motivations according to the appearance of
a rational justification.71

The systematically distorted communication of ideology, in Habermas’s terms, can thus be
best understood through psychoanalysis. In repression and in hegemonic domination we are
overwhelmed by the burden of past events and distorted thoughts and communications. We can
be dominated by ideas, images, dreams and objects. As in Calderón’s kingdom, we too are ruled
by engaños, by these dreams of our rulers.
The insights of the baroque, and an appreciation of its earnest games, allow an approach to
interpretation that does not seek a binary distinction between the one truth and the many
falsehoods, but which explores the foundations of our illusions. It is only by reviewing our
illusions, and reinterpreting our dreams, that we can seek new knowledge, ‘mak[ing] it possible to
incorporate our intuitions within an account of real knowing’.72 If it is a task of the human
sciences to discover meaning through hermeneutics, it is also our task to interrogate the excesses of
meaning in those objects, acts, or utterances that make and remake our social world. Where we
discover this disconnect between the signified and the signifier, so that a symbol, myth or
performative has an aura of excess meanings beyond its literal reference, we must ask not only
what it means but what it does.73 To do this we can draw on a hermeneutics of suspicion and of
tradition, while remembering the games of the baroque, that are always so good at revealing
deception even as they deceive us.
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10.0 CONCLUSION
This inquiry began by highlighting the contemporary malaise which has seen law cut off from the
humanities and cringing before a deracinated, positivist account of the dominant natural sciences.
Law, the discipline that introduced the term ‘fact’ (fait, fatto)—what has been done—and
modelled a new conception of laws of nature to explain those facts, was reduced to doubting its
truths. In tracing a history that parallels the demise of law’s primacy as a method of knowing and
deciding, we have seen that faith in law as a code gave way to doubt of law as an instrument of
social power. Out of these doubts arose new methods, new understandings and, as I have been
advocating here, new relevance for law’s affinities with the arts and humanities. A new world of
inquiry and critique opened up once ‘the force of law’ became a problem to be solved, rather than
a faith to be defended.
Two rather ambitious questions led the charge: how do we know? and how do we live
(together)? I cannot claim to have answered them, but their respective epistemological and
ontological fields suggest points of reference for a summary of conclusions. These questions are
connected by the common problem of the split between a knowing and doing subject and a
passive, known object. Instead of stripping away our subjectivity to an inhuman object-ivity, the
reunification of knowing and being can be better achieved by recognising the power of objects
and the conditions of power over subjects.
Objects, images and representations incorporate social power. They are coded or invested
with meanings that function to remind us of certain social facts. Legal documents, the trappings
of power, items of evidence: they remember for us. The renaissance belief in the signature of the
thing turned out to be an unreliable indicator of God’s intention, but a valuable clue to social
relations. Like any memories, those coded into objects are selective and open to reinterpretation.
Indeed, they are re-remembered and subtlely changed with every recollection, invocation or
iteration. Their power is not over-determined but is contingent on the performance of each new
iteration, whether it be loyal and faithful or insurgent.
Baroque demonstrations of the unreliability of the senses led to games of illusion. These
games stimulated the playwrights and philosophers to wonder how deep they ran in social and
political life. Life, for Calderón, was a dream. Just as dreams can be more or less life-like, can be
interpreted this way or that, so representations can be recognised in many guises. In fact, in their
guise as dreams and illusions, they can be misrecognised (méconnu), to use Ricœur’s terminology.
That is to say, they can be vehicles for rationalisation and repression. Legal and religious codes
and practices provide ample material for rationalisation and for analysis, from their imagery to
their narratives, their theories and theologies. Even the naïve positivism born of half-understood
notions of science and empiricism provide backing for imperialist efforts to justify war on the
basis of purportedly uninterpreted ‘facts’. Through the conflicts of the reformation and the
counter-reformation that enlisted and formed the baroque’s sensibilities, the ‘shared dogma’ of
the west was shaken to its core. That first awakening from the ‘sleep’ of dominant religious and
legal codes prepared the way for the ‘great demystification of Power’, the return of the repressed
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that was opened up in the twentieth century.74 The insights of ideology critique and
psychoanalysis added a critical edge to the new developments in methods based in hermeneutics
and the performative.
The truth in law, as in the arts and humanities, is a deep and complex construction built of
representations and their interpretation. This interpretation is not just subjective, but
intersubjective. It is not the immediate experience of the sublime, the swoon before beauty, or
the uncritical acceptance of preinterpreted facts.75 It is built up from prior understanding,
interrogation of the subject matter, comprehension of the motivations of other people, people
like us. For this it needs a hermeneutics based in tradition and memory. Yet if we are not to be
deluded by the preferred interpretations of the people with power, and the deceptions of those
determined to cling to it, we can find truth in unexpected places: the slip of the tongue, the
repressed memory uncovered in an old ritual or image, dreams of domination.
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